ABSTRACT

Competitive elections for the House of Representatives are at an all time low. Law professors,
political scientists and political analysts all along the political spectrum believe that the current
situation not only makes for unaccountable legislators and an uneducated electorate but is also
slowly poisoning our politics by making government needlessly ideological and partisan.
Unfortunately, most of the proposed remedies call for reforms at the state level that in any event
do not hold out the prospect of changing the current pattern in the near future. This article
proposes federal legislation to deal with this problem through the creation of statewide at large
elections in our more populous states. Part I of the article briefly describes why the current
situation is not likely to change in the future without the proposed legislation. Parts II provides
historical data to support why at large elections are very likely to be more competitive than
District elections. Part III examines exactly how the Proposal would have worked had it been in
effect for the 2002 congressional elections. Part IV discusses the major advantages of the
Proposal. Part V examines possible drawbacks to the Proposal and other alternatives. A brief
conclusion follows.
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MAKING OUR CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS MORE COMPETITIVE; A PROPOSAL
FOR A LIMITED NUMBER OF STATEWIDE AT LARGE ELECTIONS IN OUR MORE
POPULOUS STATES
Walter M. Frank
Seriously contested election campaigns “educate voters”1 and provide “evaluative accountability that
legitimates the chosen representatives…”2 Unfortunately, competitive elections for the House of
Representatives are at an all time low3 and consequently most House elections neither educate voters
nor hold their representatives accountable.
Liberals and conservatives alike have decried the effect this state of affairs has had on our politics.
Thomas Mann, a noted scholar at the Brookings Institution, and Michael McConnell, a Professor of
Law at Harvard frequently mentioned as a possible Bush nominee for the Supreme Court, both assess
the current situation in strikingly similar terms.
Professor McConnell has written that currently:
“…incumbents are rendered effectively secure, which enables them to
legislate without real political accountability – and especially without
fear that members of the other party will be able to unseat them. Indeed,
with politically homogeneous districts, incumbents are more likely to
face challenges from within their party, which tend to be from the
ideological extremes. This creates an incentive against moderation in
politics and is one reason why the House of Representatives, which is
heavily gerrymandered, is more politically polarized than the Senate.”4
And Dr. Mann recently wrote:
“The legitimacy of the American electoral system requires some level of adherence
to the principles of fairness, responsiveness and accountability. Recent elections
to the U.S. House of Representatives threaten those principles. Congressional contests
suffer from an unusually high degree of incumbent safety, a precipitous decline
in competitiveness, growing ideological polarization, and a fierce struggle
between the major parties to manipulate the rules of the game to achieve, maintain,
or enlarge majority control of the chamber.”5
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Studies seem to confirm a connection between competitive elections and greater moderation:
“..there is evidence at the individual district level that more competitive seats
lead to more moderate members and that ‘cross-pressured’ members are more
likely to have more centrist voting scores.”6
To encourage more competitive House elections, I recommend in this article that Congress utilize its
power under Article I Section 4 of the Constitution7 to require that States with 8 to 14 representatives
elect one representative at large in a statewide vote, those with 15 to 21 representatives, elect 2
statewide, and States having 22 or more representatives, elect 3 statewide. I also propose that States
having less than 8 representatives be given the option, but not be required, to have l statewide elected
representative. If these requirements (the “Proposal”) had been in effect for the post 2000 census
redistricting, then 33 at large races would have occurred in a total of 21 states and an equal number of
congressional districts in those states would have been eliminated.8
The Supreme Court does not view lack of competition as a constitutional problem and has, in fact,
looked favorably on redistricting for the purpose of protecting Congressional incumbents.9 While the
Court has recognized that excessive partisan gerrymandering can theoretically be a constitutional
violation,10 no standard has been agreed upon by the Court and in a recent case four of the Justices
declared that, after almost two decades of trying, it was time to give up the effort and treat partisan
gerrymandering as non-justiciable. 11
It seems clear at this point that constitutional challenges to either partisan gerrymanders or incumbent
protection gerrymanders will not serve, certainly in the near future, to expand competitiveness for
Congressional elections. For reasons discussed in more detail later, neither bi-partisan nor nonpartisan independent commissions nor the adoption of so called neutral criteria are likely to result
soon in a major shift to more competitive House elections. The solution, if there is to be one, needs to
be national in scope, fair, and direct.
The recommendation for statewide at large elections is premised on the belief that statewide races
have the potential to be much more competitive than district races since (a) many states are fairly
evenly divided along partisan lines; (b) ticket splitting and the greater media attention on statewide
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races create more fluid dynamics that can result in more competitive elections even when one party
enjoys a substantial edge in registered voters; (c) certain advantages of incumbency are less significant
in a statewide race and (d) the moderate and independent voter is likely to have a greater impact in
such races. As will be discussed shortly, this premise is supported by a variety of historical data.
Enhancing competitiveness through the introduction of a limited number of statewide races has the
following advantages:
First, it will increase the number of competitive contests without radically altering the basic winner
take all single district system. While this might seem a weakness to advocates of more far reaching
change, such as the introduction of proportional voting,12 it does not require a wholesale shift in our
political thinking. Indeed, as will be discussed later, we had statewide at large elections for the House
of Representatives as late as the 1960’s.
Second, the proposal is simple and straightforward raising no difficult questions of legal interpretation
and imposing no significant new administrative burdens on the States.
Third, its limited scope preserves the federal system of regulation set out in Article I Section 4 and
would not prevent other reform proposals for the essentially intact district system from going forward
at either the State or federal level.
Fourth, the creation of statewide contested elections means that the voice of the independent voter,
whose influence is almost completely negated under the current districting system, will be heard.
Fifth, the proposal will provide a mechanism for party accountability in House elections that the
current system does not provide.
Finally, the creation of a limited number of at large representatives may well have important
incidental benefits. For example, the creation of a limited number of statewide elected representatives
could result in a larger pool for the emergence of national leadership.
While bills have been introduced in Congress in the last twenty years aimed at reforming the
redistricting process13 and while a number of model initiatives have been proposed to address in part
the issue at a state level,14 no serious effort has been made by the congressional leadership of either
party to pass a bill. In 2005, however, Representative John Tanner, Democrat from Tennessee,
introduced a comprehensive reform proposal that has attracted two Republican co-sponsors, Phil
Gingrey of Georgia and Zach Wamp of Tennessee.15 On March 1, 2006 Senator Tim Johnson,
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Democrat from South Dakota, introduced a bill identical to the Tanner bill in the Senate.16 The bills
are currently in the House and Senate Judiciary Committees respectively. Whether these bills will
result in a serious consideration of this issue remains to be seen but given the growing public interest
in this subject, some form of federal legislation seems a reasonable possibility.
This article begins in Part I with a brief explanation of how we have arrived at our current situation
and why it is unlikely to change without congressional intervention. Part II presents historical
evidence to support the premise that statewide races will increase the number of competitive elections.
In Part III, I propose a numerical goal for competitive elections. I then suggest a way of establishing a
“competitiveness” rating for evaluating state election results and apply that measurement to the 2002
congressional election results for the states covered by the Proposal. Finally, by assuming that the
statewide results in 2002 would have mirrored those of statewide at large races had the Proposal been
in effect in 2002, I measure the increase in the number of competitive districts in 2002 that would
have occurred under the Proposal. Part IV discusses in more detail the advantages of the Proposal.
Part V discusses potential drawbacks to the Proposal and also discusses possible alternatives to and
variations on the Proposal. A brief Conclusion follows.

I.
That we have arrived at a landscape almost totally devoid of competitive elections is attributable
primarily to two factors: First, incumbent congressmen possess tremendous advantages over would be
challengers that only grow over time. These include the opportunity to perform constituent service,
name recognition, greater ability to raise money, ability to craft an image with voters through
communications paid for by the government through the franking privilege, easier access to media
exposure, and the opportunity to bring home the bacon for the District in an institution where power
and influence grow with seniority. While political scientists debate how many actual votes these
advantages translate into,17 there is no doubt that it is significant.
The second factor is the greatly enhanced ability of legislatures and other interested observers and
participants, through the use of powerful new computers and detailed data bases, to manipulate district
lines to assure desired election results. The current situation has been colorfully (and accurately)
described this way:
“The professionalization of American politics generally is mirrored by the
professionalization of redistricting. Gone are the political hacks who have
worked the neighborhoods for years, replaced by massive computerized
data sets containing ten years of precinct returns merged to census tracts
and blocks. Now there are multitudes of redistricting consultants who work
the computers, high-priced lawyers who advise on the myriad constitutional
and legal constraints, moonlighting social scientists who run racial polarization
16
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tests and provide expert testimony should the plan end up in court, and in some
places, community consultants who set up redistricting hearings and make sure
that the right groups are invited to testify. Redistricting has opened up a multiMillion-dollar industry for all of these folks in a way that could not possibly
have been anticipated by Chief Justice Warren and his colleagues on the
Court in the mid-1960’s.”18
Even when competitive districts somehow bloom, their time in the sun can be a brief one. One
example from the 2000 round of redistricting will suffice to illustrate how the current situation has
evolved.
In 1998, Rush Holt, a Democrat, was initially elected in New Jersey’s historically Republican 12th
District with 50.1% of the vote against 47.3%19 for his Republican opponent, a one term incumbent
who had replaced long time Republican Dick Zimmer.20. In 2000, Zimmer tried to regain his seat but
lost to Holt by 700 votes, one of the closest races in the country.21 For the redistricting following the
2000 census, the permanent bipartisan commission responsible for redistricting in New Jersey made
clear that any bipartisan agreement among New Jersey’s Congressional delegation would be presumed
politically fair and given great weight.22 A bi-partisan agreement was reached; understandably, one of
the key Democratic goals was to make Rush Holt’s safer. As a result, some solidly Democratic areas
(although not quite as many as requested) were added to Holt’s district. In 2002, he was elected by a
margin of more than 41,000 votes.23
While New Jersey’s Commission system is not the norm, the fact is that whenever parties share power,
incumbent protection becomes the common value that unites both sides. What is less expected is how
partisan gerrymanders (resulting when one party has complete control of the redistricting process) also
eliminate competitive districts. Theoretically, a maximally effective partisan gerrymander could
require numerous competitive races. For example, in a state with 51% Democrats and 49%
Republicans, the perfect gerrymander would produce an entire delegation of Democrats winning by
2% of the vote. In reality, most partisan gerrymanders work by providing overwhelming safety for the
18
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minority party in as few districts as possible coupled with a smaller but still assured margin of safety
for the in control party in all other districts.
The Texas redistricting of 2003 provides a good example of how partisan gerrymanders affect
competitiveness. In 2002, a Court approved redistricting plan in Texas resulted in 8 races (out of 32)
being decided by a victory margin of less than 20 points with 3 being decided by ten points or less. As
a result of the 2002 state legislative elections, the Republicans gained complete control of the state
government and revised the redistricting plan with the sole view of increasing the number of
Republican representatives.24 These limited revisions to the existing plan for partisan purposes had a
marked impact on competitiveness level reducing the number of races decided by less than 20 points
from 8 to 5 and the number decided by less than 10 points from 3 to 1.
This situation is unlikely to change in the near future without federal legislation since the forces that
produce it – the inherent advantages of incumbency and the incentive for gerrymandering (job security
and a smooth career path) -- will not disappear on their own. Moreover, the major efforts at reform at
the state level -- independent commissions, the adoption of neutral redistricting criteria, and the
adoption of competitiveness as an explicit redistricting standard-- will not necessarily lead to more
competitive elections. Dr. Mann has written:
“Designing a commission that is neutral toward or that dampens the influence
of both incumbents and parties is a challenge with which few states have
successfully grappled.”25
“Party control of a state delegation to the U.S. House carries few benefits, and minor
shifts in the partisan composition of the New Jersey House delegation are unlikely
to affect which party is in the majority in Washington. That encourages bipartisan
collaboration in maintaining the status quo.”26
It bears mentioning that, if mid-cycle gerrymandering survives, as seems very likely, in the Court’s
consideration of the cases arising out of Texas’s voluntary 2003 redistricting, there may be further
erosion, if that’s possible, in the number of competitive elections, as gerrymandering becomes an even
more effective and flexible tool for manipulating election results.
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The constitutional validity of this mid-cycle redistricting, along with a number of other issues, is currently before the
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II.
Several strands of historical evidence strongly suggest that statewide at large elections for Congress in
the states covered by the Proposal will be much more competitive than district elections. The first
strand involves a comparison of statewide margins of victory in election year 2002 (and 2004 where
necessary to establish a statewide margin) with average victory margins in the district races for
Congress in 2002. The second strand compares this same average margin of victory in District races
for 2002 with the total vote each party received in the aggregate in that State in House elections that
year. A third strand discusses the last statewide at large congressional elections that occurred in 1962
and 1964. Finally, I point out certain data to show how much more mixed in general are statewide
election results than the results of the heavily gerrymandered, incumbent protected districts that
currently exist.27

District Races versus Statewide Races; District Races versus Aggregate Partisan Vote. Table A
of the Appendix compares the average margin of victory in Congressional races in 2002 in each of the
21 states that would have had at large elections in 2002 under the Proposal with the margin of victory
in statewide contests for Governor and Senator in 2002 (2004 if no state races in 2002).28 I should
note that districts in which the margin of victory was sixty points or better, including races in which
there was no opposition from the other major party, were excluded from computing the average
margin of victory for District races to avoid overstating those margins. The results are striking but not
unexpected. In 13 of the 21 states the average District margin exceeded by at least 20 points the
margin in the state race(s)and in another 5 states there was a difference of between 10 and 20 points.
The results are even more revealing when States are analyzed individually. In Tennessee only 1
district race out of 9 was decided by less than 30 points yet the gubernatorial race was decided by 3
points and the Senate race less than 10 points In Missouri no congressional race was decided by less
than 20 points and the average margin of victory was 36.32 points; meanwhile the governor’s race in
2002 was decided by 3 points. In Minnesota the average margin of victory in the House races was
30.58 points while 7.91 points decided the Governor’s race. Similar dramatic differences can be seen
in the results of Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, North Carolina, Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio
and California. Less dramatic but still significant differences were recorded in Florida, New York,
Pennsylvania and Texas.

27

All election statistics for elections to the House in the tables in the Appendix were, unless otherwise noted, based on
election results provided in Congressional Districts in the 2000s, A Portrait of America, David R. Tarr, ed., CQ Press
(2005). This volume provided the percentage of each candidate’s vote as a share of the total vote as well as the raw vote
for the 2002 elections. Statewide results for Governor and Senator for 2002 and 2004 were taken from the 2006 Almanac
of American Politics, Michael Barone, ed. While the Almanac of American Politics also contained the percentage of each
candidate’s vote for the 2002 House elections, they were not carried out to as many decimal places as Congressional
Districts in the 2000s.
28
2002 was used because it was the first election following the most recent round of redistricting and also because it was
not a presidential election year and, therefore, the closeness of that race in 2000 and 2004 would not have influenced the
results.
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Even in highly one-sided States, statewide races hold out the prospect of greater competition. In
Massachusetts, for example, in 2002 no Republican was elected to Congress from the entire state, the
average margin of victory in races in which there was any Republican opposition at all was 24 points,
and there was no opposition in 5 of 10 races. Yet in 2002 the voters also elected a Republican
Governor by a margin of 4.3 percentage points
We know how close the presidential election results were in both Florida and Ohio in 2000. 29 Yet in
2002 no congressional race in Ohio was decided by less than 17 points and the average margin of
victory was 37.4 points and, while Florida had 3 out of 25 races decided by 10 points or less, the
average margin of victory was still 28.78 points and 19 out of 25 races were decided by a margin of
20 points or greater.
There is no reason to believe that the dynamics of statewide races for the House would differ radically
from those at work for gubernatorial and U.S. Senate races.
Included as Table B of the Appendix is a chart comparing the same average margin of victory in
District races in each State shown in Table A with the aggregate vote received by each party for its
candidates for Congress statewide. Again the results strikingly show how many states, which in the
aggregate are closely divided, have resolved themselves into a series of partisan fiefdoms. The results
are particularly notable for some of the larger states. In Michigan, for example, the average margin of
victory in the Congressional races was 33.8 points while the aggregate difference in the total partisan
vote was 1.1 points. Similar differences occurred for Illinois, Ohio, California, New York and Texas.
Smaller states showing very significant differences included Maryland, New Jersey, Minnesota,
Missouri and Tennessee.
Results for 1960’s At Large Elections
Prior to the adoption of the one man one vote rule, statewide at large elections for the House of
Representatives would occur, as a matter of course, when states gained House seats following a
census and the Legislature was unable to agree on a redistricting plan. 30 We, therefore, have a body of
evidence that allows us to directly compare at large results with District results in the same election
year.
Five at large congressional elections were held in 1962.31 Four resulted from a gain, following the
1960 census, of one House seat in each of Ohio, Michigan, Maryland and Texas. The fifth at large
election was in Connecticut, which had been holding one at large election since 1932 when

29

President Bush won in Florida by 537 votes out of 5,825,043 votes cast; he won Ohio by a margin of 50.0% to 46.4 for
Al Gore and 2.5% for the Green Party. See America at the Polls, 1960-2000, John F. Kennedy to George W. Bush, A
Handbook of American Presidential Election Statistics, Alice V. McGillivray, Richard M. Scammon, Rhodes Cook, eds.
CQ Press, 2001.
30
See Gary Cox, On the Systemic Consequences of Redistricting in the 1960’s, appearing in Redistricting in the New
Millennium, Peter F. Galderisi, ed. (2005), particularly the material on pages 17 to 19.
31
All calculations in this Section are based on election results contained in Congressional Quarterly’s Guide to U.S.
Elections, Volume II, Fourth Edition, Jon L. Moore, Jon P. Preimesberger, and David R. Tarr, eds., (2001).
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Connecticut gained a sixth seat. We will discuss the Connecticut experience in a moment, but the
experiences of the other states, particularly Ohio and Michigan, are instructive as well.32
In Michigan in 1962, the at large election was decided by a margin of 4.1 percentage points. That was
the closest congressional race in Michigan that year and the average margin of victory in District races
(again excluding races decided by more than 60 percentage points) was 22.58 points. There was no at
large election in Michigan in 1964 since a redistricting plan creating the additional district was
effectuated prior to that date.
In Ohio, Robert Taft Jr., a hallowed name in Ohio politics, won the at large election in 1962 by a
margin of 21 points. However, in 1964, a big Democratic year, the Democrat, Robert Sweeney,
defeated the Republican Oliver Bolton by 4.4 points, a swing in one election from the Democrats to
the Republicans of approximately 25 points.
This fluidity of statewide results from one election cycle to the next is one of the two keys to the
likely increase in competitiveness that would result from statewide at large elections, the other key of
course being the absence in the first place of district lines drawn to benefit a particular party or
incumbent.
The history of Connecticut’s at large election is also instructive. A total of 21 at large elections were
held in Connecticut between 1932 and 1962. During the 8 elections occurring between 1932 and 1946,
the at large seat changed hands from one party to the other 7 times. In only one election (1936) did the
party holding the seat manage to keep it. After Antoni Sadlak gained the seat for the Republicans in
1946, he managed to hold on to the seat until he was beaten in the Democratic tide of 1958. But what
is interesting is what relatively little advantage he gained from incumbency, as evidenced by the fact
that though he won in 1946 by almost 15 points, he won in 1948 by less than half a point, in 1950
by .8 of a point, and in 1954 by 2 points.33
Lack of Partisan Uniformity in Statewide Results.
District elections are predictable for a number of reasons of which skillful gerrymandering to achieve
a desired result is an important but not the only one. Districts that are homogeneous either because
their voters share common economic or other interests or because they are majority minority districts
will often also be predictable in their voting patterns.
State results are much less predictable, certainly along party lines, because while districts are often
characterized by homogeneity, states, particularly the more populous states, are not. To cite just a few
items,34 in only 17 out of 50 states does one party hold both U.S. Senate seats and also the
32

Texas was still a one party Democratic State in 1962 but even its results are illustrative. In 1962 the at large Democrat
won by 12.2 percentage points; that year only 3 of the District races out of 22 were as close. Maryland’s at large race was
decided by 11.4 points in 2002 which was closer than all but 2 of the 7 Maryland District races that year.
33
It should be noted that while these were remarkably close races for an incumbent, Connecticut congressional district
races in general were very competitive during this period.
34
The material in this paragraph, other than the last sentence, was drawn from the 2006 Almanac of American Politics,
Michael Barone, ed.
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governorship.35 (Interestingly, only 1 of the 8 most populous states is included on that list). In 13
states, the Senate seats are divided between the parties.36 In 11 states the party holding the two to one
edge for the two Senate seats and the governorship lost the presidential vote in 2004.37 In 2000, Al
Gore carried Michigan, Illinois, New York, Pennsylvania and New Jersey. That year, each of these
states had a Republican governor.38
To summarize, the results described in this Part II provide a strong foundation for believing that the
introduction of a relatively limited number of statewide at large elections for the House of
Representatives could significantly increase the number of competitive elections for the House.
Undoubtedly, anomalous results affect the individual tabulations in one year for any State. But viewed
in the aggregate these results confirm what is perhaps intuitively plain in any event, namely that
elections in which self-interested legislators cannot manipulate the voting profiles of their constituents
are bound to result in more fluid and competitive electoral contests.

III.
If statewide at large elections will produce a more competitive landscape, the next question is how
competitive a landscape do we want. I suggest as a standard that either (i) one out of every five races
should be very competitive defining a very competitive district as one where the percentage point
margin between the candidates of the two major parties is less than 10 points or (ii) two out of every
five races should be competitive, defining a competitive district as one where the margin is less than
20 points. This level of competitiveness would do much to assure that each election cycle would
constitute to a significant extent a referendum on the performance of the House of Representatives,
particularly but not exclusively the performance of the majority party.
How do the states that would be affected by the Proposal stack up against this standard? To show this,
I have developed in Table C of the Appendix a very simple method of rating and comparing state
election results for competitiveness. For each Congressional race in 2002 decided by less than 10
percentage points, a State was awarded two points, for each race decided by more than 10 but less
than 20 percentage points, 1 point was awarded. The total number of points earned was divided by the
maximum number of points that a state could earn under the system (2 times the number of districts in
the state) to calculate the State’s competitiveness rating.
The results are set forth in Table C in the Appendix. A State meeting the competitiveness standard
would have a rating of .2 but, as can be seen from the table, sixteen of the twenty-one states failed to
35

These states are: Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New
Jersey, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
36
These States are: Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,
Oregon, Rhode Island and South Dakota.
37
These states are: Arkansas, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island.
38
The Governors were George Ryan (Ill.), Argeo Cellucci (Mass.), Christine Whitman (N.J.), George Pataki (N.Y.), and
Tom Ridge (Pa.). See The Book of the States, Vol. 33, p. 15.
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meet this very lenient standard. There are a total of 338 congressional districts in the 21 states
covered by the Proposal. If each State just met the standard, then the states would have a combined
score of 135.2 (calculated by multiplying 338 x 2 and multiplying the result, 676, by .2). In actuality,
the States achieved a combined competitiveness score of 77 for the 2002 elections.
It is worth noting that the largest States generally had the worst competitiveness rating. California was
almost in a class by itself having only 1 race out of 53 under 10 points and only 2 additional races
below 20 points. Or consider that 4 states (Missouri, Massachusetts, Virginia and Wisconsin) had no
races decided by less than 20 points and 2 more (Michigan and Ohio) had no races decided by less
than 10 points.
To measure the impact of the Proposal on the competitiveness rating of each State had it been in effect
in 2002, I assumed that the congressional statewide races would have mirrored the state wide party
vote in U.S. Senate and gubernatorial races for that year (or for 2004 if there were no statewide
elections in 2002). If there were two statewide elections I averaged the results. I also assumed that the
state would have still had the same number of elections decided by less than 10 and 20 points as it had
without the Proposal being in effect, except that for each of the 5 States with a competitiveness rating
of .2 for the actual 2002 results, I subtracted a point from its total in computing the revised
competitiveness rating because states with an already high competitive rating would be more likely to
lose a competitive district than ones with a lower rating. As the table shows, the introduction of the 33
at large elections would have resulted in an increase in very competitive elections from 25 to 42 and
competitive elections from 27 to 35. To put the Revised rating in raw score terms, the Proposal would
have increased the combined score of the 21 states from 77 to 119, still short of the goal but
substantially better.
IV.
I believe that the Proposal should be adopted because it is the most direct but least federally intrusive
way of creating more competitive congressional elections. I discuss the key advantages of the
Proposal below.
Accommodating Increased Competition with Incumbent Protection
Many commentators argue that incumbent protection is a positive good because it advances the goal
of a stable two party system, assures continuity in policy making, provides a cadre of experienced
representatives, and encourages able individuals to continue in public office.39 Others disagree.40 A
major virtue of the Proposal is that it does not require this long running debate to be resolved since it
will likely increase the number of competitive Congressional elections without significantly altering
the current district system. At the same time, as discussed below, it would not preclude other reform
proposals from going forward to deal with the vast majority of elections that would still continue at
the district level.
39

See, for example, Nationiel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence of
Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 649 (2002).
40
See, for example, Issacharoff, Supra, Note 1.
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Given that the current congressional districting system is essentially preserved, all the positive aspects
which some commentators attribute to incumbent protection would still be in place, subject, of course,
to whatever additional refinements (independent commissions, neutral criteria) which individual states
might make to their system. But the price of incumbent protection and partisan gerrymandering, in
terms of non-competitive elections, would no longer be quite as high.
In one respect, the Proposal may actually protect incumbents by enabling an out of power party to
preserve key incumbents who are the intended victims of a partisan gerrymander by the in control
party. One of the key strategies for effectuating severe partisan gerrymanders is to pit incumbents of
the victim party against each other in the same district under the new redistricting plan. At large
districts would afford incumbents pitted against each other the opportunity for both to be returned to
Congress since one could choose to run in an at large district. In fact, the opportunity to run state wide
might provide the more ambitious incumbent an opportunity to gain wider recognition, a helpful
stepping-stone to higher office. Thus, at large districts might actually mitigate one of the more
perverse effects of severe partisan gerrymanders and actually protect worthy incumbents. “Worthy” is
a fair choice of words here given that the intended incumbent victim would only be returned if he or
she could win a statewide contest.
And the Proposal would even afford a final chance for incumbents gerrymandered out of existence by
their own party. Consider for a moment the case of Ben Gilman, a moderate, well respected 15 term
Republican Congressman from New York When New York lost 2 seats as a result of the reallocation
of seats among the states following the 2000 census, Mr. Gilman was the victim of a gerrymander
engineered in part by his own party whose leaders apparently were afraid that his District would go
Democratic once he retired.41 “In effect, Gilman’s district was carved up among his neighbors.”42
With a limited at large system, Mr. Gilman might at least have had a shot at continuing his
Congressional service.
Legal and Straightforward
There is no question in this writer’s view that statewide at large elections pass constitutional muster.
Congressional authority to enact electoral regulations is well established.43 If Congress has the
constitutional authority to require districts to adopt a winner take all, single district system, it certainly
has the authority to modestly modify the system to address one of its most pernicious effects.44
41

The 2004 Almanac of American Politics, Michael Barone, ed. P. 1155-1156.
Id at p. 1156.
43
See Ex Parte Siebold 100 U.S. 717 (1879) confirming Congressional authority to enact criminal penalties for federal
election violations).
44
Professor Paul McGreal has argued that the constitutionality of the federal statute requiring single member districts has
been called into question by recent Supreme Court precedents returning certain powers to State Government. See Paul E.
McGreal, Unconstitutional Politics, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 519 (2001). While this is not the place to comment
extensively on Professor McGreal’s artice, I should note that I do not share his view given that the manner of election of
the nation’s representatives seems to be very much a matter of national import for which the Constitution clearly gives the
Congress supervisory power. The fact that the basic statutory scheme has been in effect since 1842 would also argue
strongly against the likelihood of its being overturned now on the grounds suggested. The following statement by
Madison in Federalist No. 59, also undercuts, in my view, Professor McGreal’s position: “Nothing can be more evident
than that an exclusive power of regulating elections for the national government, in the hands of the State legislatures,
42
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Moreover, the system will not add any additional administrative burdens. The Proposal simply
requires the elimination of a specified number of districts from the redistricting plan. In any given
State, the resulting redistricting plan may be made more or less complicated by the reduced number of
districts but it certainly does not raise, with one possible exception, any issues that are qualitatively
different than those that would occur with any redistricting. The one exception relates to the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 as amended, specifically, the possible argument that at large districts might
constitute minority influence districts under certain circumstances. I do not believe that this argument
would be persuasive but it does add a possible new dimension to Section 2 (vote dilution) and Section
5 (retrogression) cases.
A National Solution that Preserves the Federal System intended by the Framers
The creation of a limited number of at large districts does not preclude and may even encourage
reform of the congressional single district system. Since the districting system would still be in place,
proposals at the State level aimed at decreasing partisan gerrymandering, increasing the transparency
of the process, and continuing the reduction in excessive incumbent protection lose none of their
credibility or importance.
The federal statute proposed in this article is an attempt to address a serious national problem, the
unacceptably low number of competitive congressional elections in the very body of our national
government that was supposed to be, through frequent elections, most responsive to the changing
views of the people.45 This is a problem that transcends the capacity of individual states to deal with
effectively and, in some sense, is not their problem.
Madison in the Federalist papers shows that the House and the Senate were viewed by the framers in
fundamentally different ways that has real implications for our subject. In Federalist No. 39, he writes:
“The House of Representatives will derive its powers from the people of America; and the
People will be represented in the same proportion, and on the same principle, as they are
In the legislature of a particular State. So far the government is national, not federal. The
Senate, on the other hand will derive its powers from the States, as political and coequal
Societies…”46
Congress was given broad residual power to regulate the time, manner and place of holding elections
to the House precisely because the framers feared manipulative devices by the States that could undo
the structural framework they were creating. 47 This, I would submit, is precisely what has happened
over a period of decades. While it cries out for correction, it can be corrected in a way that does not
would leave the existence of the Union entirely at their mercy.” This quotation was found in Jamal Greene, Judging
Partisan Gerrymanders under the Elections Clause, 114 Yale Law Journal 1021 at 1034 (2005). Professor Greene’s article
contains a valuable account of the adoption of the elections clause at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and the
subsequent debate over its merits at the state ratifying conventions. (see pages 1030 to 1034).
45
See The Federalist No. 57 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright, ed., Harvard University Press, 1961) reprinted as
Barnes and Noble Books edition, p. 385 (2004)
46
The Federalist No. 39, p 283, Supra Note 20.
47
See U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton 514 U.S. 779 at 791-792 (1995).
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do great violence to the other clear intent of the framers, namely, that for the most part, the time, place
and manner of holding elections be left to the States.
Fairness to the Independent Voter
All voters are victims when election outcomes are fixed in advance because elections are intended to
provide the accountability that fixed outcomes are intended to avert. Independent voters arguably
suffer a particular affront since they are more prone than other voters to look beyond party
identification.48 Committed Democratic and Republican voters, even when a minority in a lopsided
district, achieve what is sometimes referred to as “virtual representation”49 since even the most
partisan gerrymanders will result in some safe seats for their party. Not so for the independent voter
whose vote is simply not needed in the vast majority of congressional districts today which have been
drawn to be safe for one of the two major parties.
Since, as described above, the creation of at large districts will almost assuredly result in more
competitive elections, independent voters will be courted and may often provide the crucial margin of
victory. In a 2004 National Election Studies survey50 of partisan identification, 40 % of those
surveyed classified themselves as independent. Of this group, when asked whether they considered
themselves closer to the Democratic or Republican Parties, approximately 25% did not think of
themselves as closer to either party, roughly 32% thought themselves closer to the Republicans and
43% closer to the Democrats.51
It would seem a fair assumption that voters who initially classified themselves as independent would
be willing to vote for candidates of either party even if they viewed themselves as closer to one of the
parties. Thus, statewide at large elections will give a meaningful voice to the roughly 40% of the
voting population who have been effectively exiled from the current system of electing congressional
representatives.
Strengthening the Two Party System
There are two strong reasons for believing that at large state congressional races could largely become
referenda on the performance of the party in power in Congress.
First, non-partisan factors such as a personal following based on constituent service and the ability to
bring home the bacon for the district would be less important at the statewide level with its much
greater population, not to mention that all voters would still be represented by a district congressman
with district offices to whom they most likely would instinctively turn for assistance.
48

Elsewhere, in an article to be published shortly, I have argued, among other things, that a state-redistricting plan
containing virtually no competitive contests violates the equal protection rights of independent voters.
49
See Pamela S. Karlan and Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting is Different, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1201, 1209 (1996).
50
Harold W. Stanley and Richard G. Niemi, Vital Statistics on American Politics 2005-2006, Table 3-1, p. 116. The
information contained in Table 3.1 was calculated by the editors from National Election Studies data, Center for Political
Studies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor (http://www.umich.edu/~nes
51
Id.
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Second, at large representatives would occupy an interesting niche in the governmental structure.
They would certainly not, as already noted, be as service oriented as District elected Representatives
but neither would they be expected to have the institutional influence of United States Senators since
they would still be 1 of 435 not 1 of 100. Without the incumbent advantages arising from constituent
service and success in representing district interests, at large representatives would likely be defined
primarily by their positions on public issues. They would in turn have a particularly strong interest in
broadening their party’s appeal and assuring that the party took positions consistent with the views of
the State’s voters. Thus, at large elections would very likely turn on which party best represented the
thinking of a majority of the State’s voters.
At large districts would contribute to a stable two party system for an additional reason. Political
commentators all along the spectrum have commented on the tendency of the current highly
gerrymandered system to exaggerate the influence of the more ideologically fervent members of the
two parties.52 This influence is the direct result of the fact that when incumbents are virtually
guaranteed re-election, their main vulnerability lies, as noted by Professor McConnell,53 in the
nominating process in which usually only the most fervent of partisans participate. Thus, the current
system produces candidates with a built in bias, based on self-interest, to cater to their party’s
ideological partisans.
At large districts would likely prove an effective counterweight to this phenomenon since statewide
candidates, particularly in states fairly evenly divided along partisan lines, would want to appeal to as
many moderate and independent voters as possible.
A number of Supreme Court justices have referred to the broad non-ideological nature of our major
parties. 54 That description seems to be less and less apt in today’s politics. Whether that is good or
bad, the fact remains that as parties become more ideological they will inevitably leave gaps that can
only be filled by the evolution of additional political parties. In fact, Thomas Friedman has suggested
that if the Democratic and Republican parties cannot work together on the energy issue, “I’m certain
there is going to be a third party in the 2008 election. It’s going to be called the Geo-Green Party and
it’s going to win a lot of centrist votes.”55A limited at large system that restores some bias toward
moderation and breadth by checking the bias favoring the ideological wings of the two parties, would,
in the long run, help preserve a stable two party system.
More Effective National Leadership
Starting with Theodore Roosevelt, seventeen different individuals have been elected President. Of
these, all but 4 (Taft, Hoover, Eisenhower and Bush 41) were elected to statewide office as either a
Governor or U.S. Senator before assuming the presidency. At present, therefore, the most likely pool
52

See, for example, Thomas L. Friedman, Thou Shall Not Destroy the Center, N.Y. Times, November 11, 2005, at A 23;
Lexington, “Slumbering On,” the Economist, April 9, 2005, p. 28.
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Supra, Note 4.
54
See Justice Powell’s dissent in Rosario v. Rockefeller 410 U.S. 752, 769 (1973) joined in by Justices Douglas, Brennan
and Marshall, and Justice Thomas’s dissent in Colorado Republican Campaign Committee v. Federal Election
Commission 518 U.S. 604, 647 (1996) joined in by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia.
55
Thomas L. Friedman, Gas Pump Geopolitics, the New York Times, April 28, 2006, p. A23.
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of presidential candidates for both parties will generally constitute a total of 150 persons (50
governors and 100 U.S. Senators) currently serving in those positions plus any former occupants of
those positions being seriously mentioned. The Proposal, by creating an additional pool of statewide
elected national officeholders, would at a minimum provide an additional avenue for wider
recognition that could expand the list of serious presidential prospects.
V.
Proposal Disadvantages
Repairing a political problem is not like fixing a car. Changing the brake shoe doesn’t mean that you
suddenly have to start worrying about the engine. Not so with democratic institutions which are so
deeply interwoven that any institutional change is often accompanied by other unsought changes.
In the case of the proposal advanced in this article, three unsought but inevitable impacts come to
mind.
First, the creation of statewide at large districts will reduce the number of congressional districts in the
affected states and thus increase the number of each representative’s constituents in the remaining
districts. The very limited number of at large elections (33, leaving 402 districts) created under the
Proposal, however, does largely mitigate this concern. In the States for which one at large district is
proposed, those with eight to fourteen representatives, the impact will obviously be greatest in the
States with eight representatives, since only seven districts would remain to absorb the lost district’s
population whereas in a state with fourteen representatives thirteen districts would absorb the lost
district’s population. Under the Proposal, districts would be somewhere between 7.7 % and 14.24 %
larger than they otherwise would be but for the introduction of the at large district.56 The same ratios
would hold for the States required to have two or three at large elections (indeed the Proposal is
intended to have this result) although for states with 28 or more representatives the percentage
increase in district size would be even less than 7.7% % owing to the greater number of districts
absorbing the loss of the three districts. These levels of increase appear to this writer to be a price
worth paying for a proposal that would help restore competitiveness, strengthen the two party system,
encourage the development of national leaders and give many more independents a meaningful vote in
House elections.
The second likely negative is incidental and difficult to quantify but deserves mention, namely, the
increase in cost of at large statewide races in comparison to district races. One might argue that the
amount of money that can be raised in any congressional election cycle is finite and that the
introduction of at large districts will likely have a negligible effect on the total cost of an election. It
might also be possible to develop special public funding provisions for at large elections that could
56

Take, for example, a state of 8 districts with 100 people in total or 12.5 people per district. Spreading those 100 people
over 7 districts would increase each district’s size to 14.2 people, an increase of 14.24%. Assuming a 14 district state with
12.5 persons per district reduced to 13 districts would mean an increase in district size to 13.46 persons per district or
7.68%.
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serve as a model for other offices. In any event, I would submit that the financial impact is too
conjectural and incidental to affect the merits of the Proposal.
Finally, the Proposal could be seen as unfair to the more populous states since it arguably weakens
their opportunities for incumbent protection. In an institution where power and influence accompany
seniority, this is potentially a serious consideration. At the Proposal’s modest numbers, however, I
would submit that this difficulty is primarily theoretical but it is a potential issue for anyone who
might advocate the creation of significantly more at large districts for the populous states.
Possible Variations
Another possible route to the goal of more competitive elections would be for Congress to mandate
that competitiveness be included as a criteria in drawing district lines or, even more directly, to require
that a certain proportion of districts be drawn with a roughly equal percentage of registered Democrats
and Republicans, subject to the requirements of one person, one vote and the Voting Rights Act of
1965.
A general mandate to include competitiveness is superficially appealing. But it is not difficult to
imagine legal and political controversies arising as to whether a given districting plan gave sufficient
weight to this requirement. Moreover, a criterion of competitiveness could still be manipulated when
one party controls the redistricting process party since nothing would prevent the competitive districts
from coming at the expense of the minority party’s incumbents. Indeed, the requirement of
competitive districts could force a partisan gerrymander to be more aggressive than it might otherwise
have been by limiting the possibility of creating overwhelmingly safe districts for the minority party.
Also, when one party controls the process, it is likely that even competitive districts will be shaped in
subtle ways to give an advantage to the party controlling the gerrymander. Requiring that a particular
proportion of districts be drawn with roughly equal Democrats and Republicans is a more definite way
of mandating competitiveness and has the virtue of clarity but would still be subject to manipulation
in the case of partisan gerrymandering.
Simply mandating competitiveness could also produce very one sided delegations, particularly in
States where either party enjoys a substantial advantage, for if the competitive districts go in favor of
the majority party, most of the other districts in the State would likely go for the majority party as well
given that many minority party votes would have been wasted in the lost competitive races.
One possible variation of the Proposal would be to provide the States an option to introduce a limited
number of statewide at large districts but not to mandate them. The success of the Proposal would,
however, then depend on the extent to which it is adopted by the States and, therefore, defeat its main
purpose -- to assure an increase in competitive elections. Moreover, piecemeal adoption by some
States but not others could produce overall unfairness to one of the two major parties depending on
who controls what legislatures and governorships. And, if mid-cycle redistricting becomes more
prevalent, at large districts could appear and disappear to satisfy the needs of the party in power.
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The Tanner Bill
The Tanner bill, mentioned earlier,57 would require each State to appoint an Independent Redistricting
Commission responsible for developing a redistricting plan. The Commission would consist of an
equal number of members appointed by the Democratic and Republican parties plus a chairperson to
be agreed upon by the members appointed by the two parties. The chair would be the deciding vote if
the commission members from the two parties could not agree on a redistricting plan. The plan
developed by the Commission would be submitted to the Legislature for approval or rejection but
would not be subject to amendment.
In addition to adhering to the one person, one vote standard and the applicable requirements of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, the bill establishes preservation of continuity of political subdivisions,
continuity of neighborhoods, compactness and contiguity as criteria for the plan. The bill specifically
forbids the Commission from taking into account the voting history or political party affiliation of the
District or the residence of incumbents,58except that the bill provides that voting history can be taken
into account “to the extent necessary to comply with any State law which requires the establishment of
competitive Congressional districts.” Provision is made for the adoption of a plan by the judiciary if
the Commission is never appointed or a plan is not timely adopted in accordance with the dates
established by the bill.
The Tanner bill is a thoughtful attempt to limit partisan and incumbent gerrymandering. It is based on
the premise that it is possible to create politically fair districts based upon purely neutral criteria.
There are some who dispute this premise, arguing that it is impossible to produce truly neutral
criteria.59
But the bill’s exception for taking into account voting history for the purpose of creating competitive
districts only comes into play if a State chooses to make competitiveness a criterion. Nothing in the
Tanner bill directly requires the States to make competitiveness a criterion.
The Tanner bill ultimately seeks to make districting a technical, non-partisan exercise. Whether, as a
practical matter this is truly possible would, if the bill were enacted, await the verdict of time.

57

Supra, Note 14 and accompanying text.
The provision in the bill prohibiting an independent commission from considering the residence of incumbent members
in drawing a redistricting plan could, if taken seriously, inaugurate a minor electoral revolution. The intent of this
provision is not entirely clear. It may have been intended simply to prohibit district plans aimed at pitting incumbents
against each other but such a provision would hardly be necessary given that the state legislature is no longer drawing
district boundaries under the Tanner bill.
59
See, for example, Robert G. Dixon, Fair Criteria and Procedures for Establishing Legislative Districts, appearing in
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One potential danger implicit in the Tanner bill could actually be alleviated by the creation of a
limited number of statewide at large races. The Tanner bill, for all its good intentions, has the potential
of actually locking a state into a pattern in which the actual voting strength of the two parties in the
State is not fairly reflected in the districting plan. There is no reason why a facially neutral system
based on geographical factors could not lock in a pattern in which one of the two parties consistently
failed to achieve seats reflecting its voting strength statewide. A modest number of statewide at large
districts would act as a potential counterweight to this possibility, particularly in the case of a majority
party which was not getting its fair share of seats, since presumably, as the majority party in the state,
it would have the better chance of winning at large seats.
In summary, the Tanner bill is not a substitute for the proposal being advanced in this article since it
does not directly attack the issue of competitiveness. Additionally, the at large districts being
proposed could actually mitigate one of the potential difficulties inherent in the reliance on neutral
geographic criteria that is the foundation of the Tanner bill.

Conclusion
The two houses of Congress are now elected in ways diametrically opposite to how they were chosen
at the outset of the Republic. Then, the Senate was chosen by the state legislatures and the House of
Representatives by the people. Today, the people elect the Senate and, for the most part, the state
legislatures choose our representatives.
The noted philosopher, Isaiah Berlin, has written: “Where ends are agreed, the only questions left are
those of means, and these are not political but technical.”60 The Proposal contained in this article for a
limited number of statewide at large districts assumes agreement that competition is a good thing or at
least that the level of non-competition that currently exists is a bad thing. I have proposed in this
article a possible way to address this issue that is simple, direct, limited, and clearly authorized under
the Constitution. Moreover, it is modest in the sense that it is consistent with our constitutional
framework, presents no overarching federal mandate, and is unlikely to lead to legal questions that
would bring the judiciary further into the redistricting process. It makes no pretense at being an
intellectually satisfying solution but it is fair and pragmatic and, I believe, worthy of serious
consideration.
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Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, appearing in The Proper Study of Mankind, An Anthology of Essays, p. 191,
(Henry Hardy and Roger Hausheer, eds., 1998)

21

Appendix

Table A.

State

Av. Margin in Cong. Races

Margins for Gov. and Sen.
(Asterisks denote elections
in 2004)

Eight to Fourteen Representatives
Arizona
Georgia
Indiana
Maryland
Massachusetts
Minnesota
Missouri
New Jersey
North Carolina
Tennessee
Virginia
Washington
Wisconsin

26.8
38.9
23.3
34.3
32.0
30.58
36.32
31.6
26.8
35.31
33.14
25.97
35.04

1.04 (Gov.)
5.13 (Gov.); 6.13 (Sen.)
*7.72 (Gov.);* 24.42 (Sen.)
3.96 (Gov.)
4.3 (Gov.); Unopp. (Sen.)
7.91 (Gov.)
*2.98 (Gov.)
9.93 (Sen.)
8.4 (Sen.)
3.06 (Gov.); 9.3 (Sen.)
Unopp. (Sen.)
*12.24 (Gov.)
*11.24 (Sen.)

Fifteen to Twenty-one Representatives
Illinois
Michigan
Ohio
Pennsylvania

33.04
33.8
37.14
21.2

7.1 (Gov.)
4.02 (Gov.)
19.5 (Sen.)
9.03 (Gov.)

Over twenty-one Representatives
California
Florida
New York
Texas

35.3
28.78
37.8
31.04

4.86 (Gov.)
12.85 (Gov.)
15.9 (Gov.)
17.85 (Gov.); 11.93 (Sen.)
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Table B
The Column “Av. Margin in Cong. Races” simply repeats the first column in Table A giving the
average margin of victory in a State’s congressional races. “% point diff. in aggregate vote”
describes the percentage vote margin between the two parties when each party’s total votes in
all House races in the State are aggregated. In Georgia, for example, the Republicans received
57.46% of the aggregate vote of the two parties and the Democrats 42.64%, a difference of 14.92
points. The difference between the 2 percentages is shown in the column with the majority
party being identified next to the percentage.
State

Av. Margin Cong. Races

% point diff. in aggregate vote

Eight to Fourteen Representatives
Arizona
Georgia
Indiana
Maryland
Massachusetts
Minnesota
Missouri
New Jersey
North Carolina
Tennessee
Virginia
Washington
Wisconsin

26.8
38.9
23.3
34.3
32.0
30.58
36.32
31.6
26.8
35.31
33.14
25.97
35.04

18.06 R
14.92 R
13.50 R
9.12 D
68.06 D
3.20 D
8.62 R
4.88 D
10.92 R
4.20 R
36.90 R
7.62D
13.54 R

Fifteen to Twenty-one Representatives
Illinois
Michigan
Ohio
Pennsylvania

33.04
33.8
37.14
21.2

2.44
1.10
14.28
15.9

D
D
R
R

Over twenty-one Representatives
California
Florida
New York
Texas

35.3
28.78
37.8
31.04

7.26
16.86
7.62
9.43
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D
R
D
R

Table C
The first number in each parenthesis reflects the number of very competitive races (margin
between the two major parties under 10 points) in the 2002 election and the second number
reflects the number of competitive races (margin over ten but under twenty points). The
Competitiveness Rating is calculated by giving a state 2 points for each very competitive election
and 1 point for each competitive election and then dividing the sum by a number equal to the
number of districts in the State multiplied by 2, the maximum number of points a district could
earn. The Revised Competitiveness Rating reflects the Competitiveness Rating the State would
have earned had the Proposal been in effect for the 2002 elections. It is calculated by adding to
the State’s score the number of at large elections which would have been competitive or very
competitive assuming that the margins in the at large elections would have mirrored results in
the applicable statewide elections for Governor and Senator noted in Table A.
Where there were two statewide elections, an average statewide margin was calculated and
applied. A State with an initial Competitiveness rating of .2 or better had one point
automatically deducted from its score to reflect the higher probability that it might lose a
competitive district under the Proposal since each State under the Proposal has fewer districts.
The revised sum was then divided by the same divisor as used to determine the Competitiveness
Rating since the number of total races had not changed.
State

Competitiveness Rating

Revised Rating

Eight to Fourteen Representatives
Arizona
Georgia
Indiana
Maryland
Massachusetts
Minnesota
Missouri
New Jersey
North Carolina
Tennessee
Virginia
Washington
Wisconsin

.125(1+0)
.23 (2+2)
.44 (4+0)
.25 (2+0)
0 (0 + 0)
.125 (1+0)
0 (0+0)
.038 (0+1)
.15 (1+2)
.111 (1+0)
0 (0+0)
22 (1+2)
0 {0+0)

.25 (2+0)
.29 (3+ {2 – 1})
.44 (4 + {1 -1})
.31 (3 + {0 – 1)
.05 (0 + 1)°
.25 (2+0)
.111 (1+0)
.115 (1+1)
.23 (2+2)
.222 (2+0)
0 (0+0)
.277 (2+ {2-1})
.125 (1+0)

Fifteen to Twenty-one Representatives
Illinois
Michigan
Ohio

.078 (1+1)
.066 (0+2)
.083 (0+3)

°

.078 (1+1)
.2 (2+2)
.138 (0+5)

Senator Kerry was unopposed by the Republicans and he was arbitrarily assigned a 20 point margin. When this margin
was combined with Governor Romney’s 4.2. point margin and divided by 2, an additional competitive district resulted.
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Pennsylvania

.21 (3+2)

.289 (5+{2-1})

Over twenty-one Representatives
California
Florida
New York
Texas

.037 (1+2)
.18 (3+3)
.068 (1+2)
.1774 (3+5)
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.094 (4+2)
.24 (3+6)
.12 (1+5)
.225 (3+8)

